Chapter 2002: Starting Anew

It is no exaggeration to say that the "garrison system" proposed by Liu Min represents a major reform of the current Han military and political system. In terms of "adapting measures to local conditions," it is even more unrestrained, bolder, and more thorough than the moves Liu Xu made during his time in Andong.

To a certain extent, this has even deviated from the basic principle of centralized power that the imperial court has strengthened for decades, and it is bound to provoke criticism and controversy.

Whatever the imperial court's reaction may be, in the present Hall of Diligent Governance, Prince Zhao Liu Fang's face has already sunk like water, his heart full of doubt.

This is almost an instinctive rejection, because it conflicts with the ideology Liu Fang has long formed. Liu Min's move can even be described as "heresy."

And Liu Min's "garrison system" was by no means devised in a short time. It appears that he merely took advantage of the changing situation in Anxi to propose it at the opportune moment, seizing the timing—one could call it deliberate and calculated.

However, Liu Fang did not voice his opposition immediately. He has been in Anxi for nearly a year now, observing the situation and circumstances here for a long time, and he has some understanding of matters. Because he has a foundation of investigation and practice, even though he is displeased, Liu Fang finds it hard to oppose rashly. After all, Anxi does indeed need some changes to adapt to the new situation.

This garrison system, saturated with enfeoffment connotations, can be seen as Liu Min's gesture of goodwill toward the Anxi officers and soldiers—a means of winning hearts by generously ceding power and benefits to buy over the mid- and low-ranking officers of Anxi.

It is also a way to retain people. If no measures were taken, then in the near future, the Anxi officers and soldiers would likely leave one after another. It can be said with certainty that most of the current Anxi army officers and soldiers harbor thoughts of returning home. On the one hand, after so many years of fighting, the troops are weary; even those who have served the shortest time in Anxi have been there for over three years.

Leaving aside those who died wrapped in horsehide, those who survived naturally want to return to the Great Han with their merits and spoils, to taste the vanity of returning home in glory—this is only human nature.

Especially against the backdrop of the major policy adjustments by the Luoyang court, to be frank, within the Anxi army, there has been some restlessness in the past two months. Any officer with a bit of foresight has realized that the good days in Anxi are numbered, and perhaps the enfeoffment of Anxi as a vassal state is imminent.

Under such circumstances, it is only reasonable for the officers and soldiers to consider their own future and fate. Ordinary soldiers harbor thoughts of returning home, while officers with connections and prospects naturally prefer to return to the Great Han. There are already precedents: anyone with Anxi army experience, upon returning to the country, is guaranteed promotion—the only difference is how many ranks.

Take the artillery units, for example. Anxi has been the primary battlefield testing ground for this new weapon and new branch of service. Over the years, they have already rotated twice, and to this day, a two-thousand-man artillery corps still serves in Anxi, stationed in several cities west of Talas.

These men, no matter how the situation changes, will eventually return to the homeland. As the Bureau of Military Affairs places greater emphasis on artillery, the domestic scarcity of those who can operate cannons—especially artillerymen with combat experience—has deepened further. What can remain in Anxi will probably only be the cannons themselves and a small number of "instructors."

Given the current state of Anxi, if no active measures are taken, the Anxi army might not collapse on its own, but relying solely on the small number of officers and soldiers willing to stay and fight alongside the Governor-General's Office will be far from sufficient.

Liu Min has clearly given serious thought to these problems, and the garrison system is the solution he has proposed. Its fundamental purpose is, just like in Andong, to truly bind a portion of the officers and soldiers to Anxi, rather than merely serving as a resume item or a stepping stone.

The garrison system evidently has the function of achieving this goal. For ordinary officers, returning to the Great Han might bring promotion and added honors, but this advancement is destined to be limited. Without exceptional treatment, it is very difficult to break through class barriers.

Returning to the Great Han, one can only become a mid- or low-ranking officer. After retirement, perhaps one can become a local squire in one's hometown, or even revert to one's original identity—a farmer. Relying solely on a military merit title cannot guarantee that one's social status will never waver, for in the Great Han, those with military merits and honorific titles number at least five hundred thousand, if not a million.

But in Anxi, it is different. If His Highness the Prince of Wei's "garrison system" can be implemented, then each garrison's Commander will be a veritable "local marquis," with power even greater—far greater—than those County Magistrates back home.

As for the power of life and death, although the bureaucrats back home actually possess it, legally speaking, they are still subject to supervision and various restrictions at all levels from the central government down to the localities. But Liu Min has directly delegated this power, explicitly granting it to the various garrisons.

Even a lowly soldier in a garrison, in Liu Min's conception, would possess status privileges, legally standing above the natives and various tribes in Anxi, even above freemen. More importantly, this privilege is hereditary—as long as the incense of the family line does not die out, their descendants will enjoy this privilege for generations under the garrison system.

This gap cannot be measured in quantity. Anyone who understands the logic cannot help but be moved. With such temptation, what does it matter if one is far from the Central Plains and rooted in Anxi? Class advancement has always been as difficult as reaching heaven, but in the Anxi army, it can be achieved with ease. This is a gift from His Highness the Prince of Wei, granted only to the officers and soldiers of Anxi.

Once this takes effect, it can also attract more Han people to come—especially the family members and clansmen of these officers and soldiers. Once relatives arrive, these officers and soldiers will be thoroughly bound to the ship of Anxi.

Attracting military dependents to come west has always been something the Governor-General's Office has striven to do, but over the past decade, the results have not been significant. If it is merely some land and pasture, the temptation is far from enough.

Now it is different. Sufficient power and benefits bring sufficient temptation, and can also fully mobilize the subjective initiative of officials and civilians to actively help Anxi transfer population. Even if only twenty thousand Anxi officers and soldiers remain, in the end they can bring Anxi over one hundred thousand citizens!

For the senior Anxi generals in the Hall of Diligent Governance, they cannot fully comprehend all the benefits of this system in a short time, but even by instinct alone, they can feel its immense driving force. Once it becomes known to the lower-ranking Anxi officers and soldiers, the sensational effect will inevitably be substantial.

This system can evidently allow Anxi to rise and grow rapidly. Once the reform succeeds, the situation in Anxi can be quickly stabilized, and control over this land can be elevated to an unprecedented level. Of course, this is from the perspective of the Anxi collective as a whole.

As for within Anxi itself, the attribute of centralized power will be greatly reduced, and with the passage of time, it will inevitably be weakened. But that is a matter for the future. What urgently needs consideration now is how to establish a foothold, develop, and grow stronger.

At the same time, such a batch of "garrison nobles" cannot maintain their fighting spirit forever. Absolute privilege leads to absolute corruption; given enough time, they are likely to degenerate. But what system in this world can keep a privileged class forever fresh? So this point requires no concern at all.

This is completely different from Andong. Andong also had a long period of power dispersion and indulgence, but after the dispersion, there was a move to reclaim power—from the very beginning of the vassal state, it moved back toward centralization.

The paths of the two are entirely different, a difference caused by different social environments and circumstances. And it is foreseeable that in the future, Anxi will find it difficult to recentralize power the way Andong did—unless another great transformation comes!

However, Liu Min's explanation so far is still insufficient—at least for these senior generals, it is not enough. The garrison system targets only ordinary mid- and low-ranking officers. It holds strong appeal for ordinary people, but for them, not necessarily so.

So Liu Min immediately added that the garrison is only a baseline unit, serving as the basic unit of political, military, and economic management. Above the garrisons, there would be sub-army offices, and above those, army offices, with management models and authority running consistently through all levels.

The number of garrisons and sub-army offices would not be fixed, but the army offices would be. For now, four army offices would be established around the four cities of Suyab, Guocheng, Talas, and Yangcheng. And the army offices and sub-army offices are what Liu Min uses to buy over the senior generals.

Of course, apart from the fact that the Governor-General's Office cannot casually dismiss the Chief Commanders of the army offices, it retains the final authority of appointment and dismissal over the subordinate sub-army offices and garrisons.

The scale of a garrison follows the current organizational structure of the Anxi army. As in the homeland, the garrison is the basic independent combat unit of the Anxi army, but the organization has already changed: six infantry companies, one cavalry company, one company of archers, plus garrison guards, scouts, messengers, baggage handlers, and cooks—a garrison at full authorized strength numbers nearly six hundred men.

The Anxi Governor-General's Office currently commands over thirty thousand men. It is unrealistic to keep them all. With twenty thousand as the target, Liu Min plans to establish thirty-three garrisons in the initial phase, distributed under the sub-army offices. Before carrying out the four major reforms of the YSL religion, the Anxi army will first be reorganized according to this structure, and once the ghosts and monsters are swept away, the garrison system will be formally launched.

Of course, Liu Min's new system is still not fully refined. At least, how to organize below the garrison level, the superior-subordinate relationships, and the distribution of output have not yet produced a concrete plan. But once the major framework is set, what follows is merely internal adjustment, with ample room for coordination.

It must be said that the "garrison system" proposed by Liu Min is essentially creating a batch of new-style military merit nobles in Anxi.

But sufficient resources are needed to satisfy the garrison officers and soldiers, to satisfy these new-style nobles. Relying solely on the Governor-General's Office is not enough. Exploiting the westward migrants would not only look ugly but would also be uprooting one's own foundation—absolutely unacceptable.

Therefore, the only ones who can provide the foundation for the implementation of this enfeoffment-style garrison system, who can supply nourishment to the garrison officers and soldiers, are the local natives.

But to satisfy twenty thousand garrison troops, the current remnant natives of Anxi are far from sufficient. Even one million would not be enough; two million would be barely adequate. If we add the portion that must be allocated to the Governor-General's Office, the bureaucracy, citizens, and even surrendered nobles and tribal chieftains, then even more productive population (serfs) would be needed.

So where does the population come from? Plundering the Great Han to the east—such an act of forgetting one's ancestors is unthinkable, at least impossible for now. That leaves only one path: the west.

Therefore, Liu Min's garrison system is not merely an emergency measure for establishing a foothold in Anxi. It also possesses a high degree of expansiveness. Before it reaches Anxi's expansion limits, it will devour all resources within reach—land, wealth, population.

This will also be a more ferocious, more dangerous war beast. Before its degeneration, the energy it can unleash will destroy all obstacles in its path.

The precondition is that it can be smoothly implemented. On this matter, resistance can only come from two sides. One is the internal generals and commanders whose ideology is more loyal to the homeland, but enormous benefits are enough to buy over the majority. A small amount of opposition does not constitute a real threat.

The second is what the imperial court thinks. After all, the Anxi Governor-General's Office remains a member of the Great Han court's military and political system. Such a reform that oversteps regulations and disrupts the law, without the court's approval, would carry enormous political risk if undertaken rashly.

If it were an external minister, he would likely be denounced as harboring ulterior motives and arrested for questioning. But the one leading this matter is the Prince of Wei, Liu Min, who has also deliberately brought along a host of senior generals and princes and dukes like Liu Fang and Xiang Deming to endorse it.

And Liu Min has more to say: if the imperial court had not cut off support, why would Anxi need to seek self-reliance?