Chapter 974: Three Years of Liao
For the Great Han, the past three years had been the most favorable external environment since the founding of the dynasty. The greatest change was that military pressure from the north had greatly diminished—one could even say that after the new border defense system was established, the Khitan could no longer pose too great a threat to the Great Han.
The primary reason lay in the situation within Liao itself, which was hardly optimistic. The wounds inflicted by the great Han–Liao war were deeply etched into memory, and to this day, Liao had still not recovered from them.
Although the Liao court and its ministers had worked hard, adopting a policy of rest and recuperation and developing production, the loss of so many able-bodied men was simply not something that could be restored in a short time.
Externally, Liao adopted a policy of contracting its sphere of influence. In particular, in the regions bordering the Great Han, herders were strictly forbidden from moving south to graze, and Liao tried its best to maintain a safe distance from the Great Han.
The garrison at Shanyang of the Great Han would from time to time send light cavalry north to patrol inside and outside the Great Wall, strutting with arrogance and displaying military might. But among the common people, with the tacit approval of the upper echelons on both sides, trade between Han and Hu had been redeveloped and was growing increasingly prosperous, and by the fourteenth year of Qianyou it had already recovered to the scale of the year before the great war.
For the Great Han, this killed two birds with one stone—it had both political significance and economic benefits. Cattle, sheep, horses, and camels from the grasslands provided ample draft animals for the rebuilding of Shanyang and greatly benefited tax revenue. For Liao, through trade it obtained salt, tea, wine, grain, cloth, ceramics, and other goods from the Great Han—materials that war-ravaged Liao desperately lacked.
Of course, within this trade, the living conditions of ordinary Liao tribesmen did not fundamentally improve; their livelihoods remained difficult. Although it was a nomadic state, its livestock were not unlimited—raising them required time and a good nomadic environment.
But regardless, with both sides committed to harmonious development, the situation in the north remained relatively peaceful. Though occasional clashes occurred, they did not affect the overall picture.
However, the post-war relationship between Han and Liao remained one of hostile tension, even if it was only superficial. The Great Han had no intention of campaigning north, and the Khitan lacked the strength for conflict. But having suffered such a great loss at Han hands, in order to appease domestic sentiment, they needed to maintain the image of a formidable enemy to unite the people and ease internal contradictions.
But in the hearts of Yelu Jing and the more perceptive Liao ministers, there was absolutely no intention of reopening hostilities with the Great Han in the short term. The national policy they pursued was to rest the troops and nurture the people, accumulate strength, and quietly wait for an opportunity—an opportunity for revenge.
Of course, the Han–Liao war had also given the Khitan a more direct understanding of the Great Han's strength. Regarding future Han–Liao confrontations, Liao generals and ministers such as Yelu Xianshi and Yelu Xiezhen had proposed new concepts.
Yelu Xianshi had experience in guerrilla operations with Shi Shouxin and Guo Chongwei south of the Yin Mountains, while Yelu Xiezhen had personally experienced the head-on clashes between Han and Liao and had gained much insight.
Their opinion was that in future Han–Liao wars, one should avoid decisive frontal battles as much as possible, instead using the vast grasslands as the battlefield, relying on the advantage of home-field depth, fully exploiting the Liao army's mobility to harass, delay, stall, and exhaust the enemy, and then seek an opportunity to break them.
This change was one that had to be made after a great defeat, in the aftermath of bitter reflection. But it also meant that the Liao army's strategy and tactics had become more conservative, automatically casting themselves in the role of the defender.
On the other hand, although the Khitan had adopted a policy of avoiding the enemy's edge and contracting their power in Han–Liao relations, Yelu Wuzhi had proposed a strategy to the Liao emperor: a western expedition, expanding their sphere of influence to the west.
Throughout its history, the core ruling region of Liao had always been in the northeast. Unlike the grassland overlords of the past, it had never undertaken deeper expansion into the Western Regions.
According to Yelu Wuzhi's recommendation, if Liao expanded westward, it could seize land and pastures, enrich its population, and plunder the western tribes to fatten itself. More importantly, if it could penetrate the Western Regions or even cut off the Hexi Corridor, then in future Han–Liao wars, Liao would have far more options. Yelu Wuzhi truly deserved to be called one of the rare farsighted figures in Liao's upper echelons—this was a vision aimed at the future, and the Great Han's expansion to the west in recent years could not be hidden from discerning eyes.
Yelu Jing agreed with this. The Great Han to the south was at the height of its power and could not be challenged head-on, but the forces to the west were nothing to the iron cavalry of the Great Liao.
Although the national policy of westward advance was set, it was treated as top secret, known only to the few civil and military officials trusted by the Liao emperor. First, given Liao's situation, it could not organize a sufficiently powerful westward force in a short time. Second, if Liao advanced west, the Han army would certainly react.
Therefore, before formally launching, Liao needed to make more thorough preparations. This is where Liu Chengyou's decision to send Li Wanchao to recover the Hetao region and rebuild Jiuyuan came into play—it not only consolidated border defenses and protected Hexi, but also affected Liao's westward advance.
However, these matters could hardly influence Liao's strategic decisions. Over these three years, the Liao emperor Yelu Jing had gone on inspection tours more frequently, and among them, three hunting expeditions had been to the west.
As for Yelu Wuzhi, after presenting his final policy recommendation to Yelu Jing, his wounds worsened and he died in the spring of the thirteenth year of Qianyou, adding another luster to Yang Ye's achievements. From Gao Mohan, Yelu Cong, and Yelu Talie to Yelu Wuzhi—a single great war had claimed no fewer than four renowned ministers and great generals from the early years of Liao's Yingli era.
The death of Yelu Wuzhi was a tremendous loss for Liao. His prestige was the highest and his achievements the weightiest—he could be called the foremost minister of Liao. For this good minister who had helped install him and assisted him, Yelu Jing was deeply grieved, and ultimately granted him the most exalted posthumous honors.
Overall, Liao's external environment could be called favorable, and its dire internal situation had also improved, gradually trending toward stability. However, hidden worries remained within. The thirty-year-old contradiction over imperial succession could not be resolved by a single bloody purge.
Although the rebellion three years earlier had eliminated a large number of political enemies and greatly boosted Yelu Jing's personal authority, the contradictions within the imperial clan had not been eliminated. Moreover, the bloody slaughter had caused many to become estranged from Yelu Jing. Most importantly, the strength of the Four Inner Tribes, the core ruling group, had been greatly weakened—a considerable hidden danger.
At the same time, during these years, several disturbances had broken out among the many Mobei tribes under Liao's control. Although they were quickly suppressed, they proved that Liao's control over its subordinate vassal tribes was declining. Even the Jurchen in the northeast had sent envoys through numerous obstacles to pay homage to Liu Chengyou at the Eastern Capital. Although this did not represent the entire Jurchen people, it was still a good omen for the Great Han.
What troubled Yelu Jing even more were his brothers. Yelu Deguang had five sons in total, and apart from the youngest, Yelu Bishe, who was steady and obedient, none of them were particularly well-behaved.
The third brother, Yelu Tiande, had been executed years earlier for participating in a rebellion against Yelu Ruan. The second brother, Taiping Prince Yelu Yansage, had been exiled to the Northwest Pacification Commission for plotting rebellion at the start of Yelu Jing's reign. When Yelu Xiyin rebelled, he had contacted Yelu Yansage, hoping to unite with him in a grand scheme, promising to enfeoff him with the region west of Mobei.
But he was resolutely refused, and moreover received a letter back harshly rebuking him. One thing Yelu Yansage understood very well: fraternal strife was still confined to the line of Yelu Deguang—the throne could not be allowed to be usurped by a collateral branch.
However, taking advantage of Yelu Xiyin's rebellion, Yelu Yansage had indeed managed to control a certain amount of power in the northwest. Once the rebellion was pacified, this younger brother became another headache for Yelu Jing.
There was also Anping Prince Yelu Dilie. His entanglement with Yelu Xiyin and his group ran somewhat deep, and although he had not actually participated in the end, it still caused Yelu Jing considerable displeasure. Toward his brothers, Yelu Jing actually held them in high regard and had considerable expectations for them—yet each one was coveting the throne.
Additionally, in the post-war recovery, Liao had intensified its plundering of the Bohai region, which aroused discontent among the former Bohai nobles. Ever since destroying that state, Liao had adopted a policy of conciliation and appeasement toward the Bohai remnants, gradually digesting and assimilating them, preserving the power and status of their nobles, and absorbing nearly all of their territory and people.
Thus, this sudden oppression naturally stirred popular resentment. In the winter of the thirteenth year of Qianyou, a rebellion broke out in the former Bohai lands, and at its peak the rebel forces numbered as many as twenty thousand. However, Liao had managed these territories for many years, and although its ruling foundation could hardly be called rock-solid, it was not something a ragtag band of Bohai remnants could shake. In no more than two months, it was suppressed by Gao Xun, Liao's Defender of the Eastern Capital.
Interestingly, after that extremely intense war with the Great Han, fought to the death, Yelu Jing actually adopted an attitude of promoting certain Han Chinese ministers. Take Gao Xun, for example—because he had defeated the landing force of Guo Tingwei in Liaodong and driven them all back across the Bohai Sea, ensuring peace in Liaodong, he was promoted by Yelu Jing to Defender of the Eastern Capital after the war. In matters of personnel, the Liao emperor sometimes truly showed considerable boldness.
And after that rebellion, Liao no longer dared to pursue oppressive policies in the former Bohai lands, instead offering appeasement. However, through that rebellion, many hostile elements who had surfaced were eliminated, and through the earlier plundering, the fiscal situation had been somewhat alleviated. But fundamentally, this had an extremely negative impact on Liao's rule.
And so, with all these disturbances spanning three years, it was only this year that Liao, from top to bottom, finally became truly settled. But because the wounds were so deep, they would still need to keep licking them...
End of Chapter
