Chapter 290
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Sometimes, when Zhao Yu got arrogant, he'd think, "I've industrialized—why should I fear nomads? Why not just take the Divine Mechanism Army and the Four Auxiliary Armies northward and crush Liao, Jin, and the Mongols all at once?"
But once he calmed down, Zhao Yu would shake his head and smile bitterly, "How could this possibly be so easy?"
Though Zhao Yu has firearms created by Li Lin and Ma Xiao Jiao that seem capable of dominating this world, in reality, the Song Dynasty's current firearms are roughly equivalent to those of the Ming Dynasty.
Historically, the Ming Dynasty had a firearms advantage over the Mongols and Jianzhou Jurchens, and Zhu Di launched multiple northern expeditions against Mobei, yet never eradicated the Mongols; in its later years, the Ming also failed to halt the rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens, who ultimately seized the Ming's realm and throne.
The reason is simple: firearms are not omnipotent.
First, consider the Mongols.
The Mongol tribes lived as nomads, with no fixed abodes, their range covering vast areas like the Mongolian Plateau and southern Siberia. Though Ming troops had firearms (such as matchlocks and cannons from the Divine Mechanism Corps), once they penetrated the grasslands, tracking the Mongol main forces became impossible—the Mongol cavalry's mobility was extreme, allowing them to evade gunfire and strike back once Ming supply lines ran dry.
Firearms heavily depended on ammunition and logistics; the harsh grassland environment and overextended supply lines severely limited their sustained combat capability.
This forced Zhu Di to define the core objective of his northern campaigns as "deterrence," not "extermination."
The problem was, the Mongols were not a unified polity but split into tribes like the Tatars and Oirats; each Ming strike could only cripple one tribe, never eliminate it—once one fell, others swiftly filled the power vacuum, making long-term suppression impossible.
Thus, the Ming could only force Mongol submission through military pressure (such as bestowing titles and permitting tribute trade), never truly occupy the grasslands.
Of course, this was also because the grasslands were unsuitable for agriculture, making rule prohibitively costly—so the Ming didn't even want to annex them; they merely wanted these nomads to stop harassing them and disrupting their peaceful lives.
Moreover, though Ming firearms were advanced, early models suffered from slow rate of fire and vulnerability to weather (rain or snow causing misfires), limiting their defensive effectiveness against Mongol cavalry charges. The Mongols also gradually acquired firearms technology through captured weapons and trade, narrowing the gap.
Now consider the Jianzhou Jurchens.
By Nurhaci's time, the Jianzhou Jurchens had formed a unified polity (Later Jin), adopting the "Eight Banners" system, merging military and civilian life, and achieving formidable combat strength.
Their operational terrain (Northeastern forests and plains) was complex—ideal for cavalry mobility and defensible mountain positions.
Ming firearms, especially heavy artillery, were difficult to deploy flexibly and struggled with siege warfare.
Later Jin gradually built its own firearms units (such as the "Heavy Cannon Corps") by capturing Ming weapons (like Yuan Chonghuan's "Red Barbarian Cannons") and recruiting Han artisans to replicate them.
By Hong Taiji's era, Later Jin's firearms technology had nearly matched the Ming's, even surpassing it in siege warfare (e. g., the Battle of Song Jin)—the Ming's firearms advantage vanished.
In short, firearms are merely one tool of war, their effectiveness constrained by geography, logistics, enemy adaptability, national strength, and strategy.
It's not enough to say the Song Dynasty now possesses some firearms and can sweep away Liao, Jin, and the Mongols.
Zhao Yu clearly understood: if the Song army suddenly used firearms against Liao and Jin forces, they might initially drive the Liao and Jin into retreat, but to utterly annihilate Liao, Jin, and the scattered Mongol tribes across the grasslands was merely fantasy.
If one recklessly pushes forward, the agricultural civilization must inevitably engage in prolonged struggle against nomadic or hunter-gatherer civilizations.
Worse, if the Song Dynasty appeared too powerful, Liao and Jin might set aside their enmity and unite against Zhao Yu.
Remember, even now, the hatred between Liao and Jin hasn't fully solidified; historically, even after Jin destroyed Liao, enslaved Liao men, seized Liao women, and desecrated Liao ancestral tombs, many Liao people still surrendered to Jin and became Jurchens.
And the scattered Mongol tribes across the grasslands, still ununified, are Zhao Yu's greatest internal threat.
If Zhao Yu recklessly charges ahead, the best he can hope for is to become the second Zhu Di—nominally sweeping the grasslands multiple times, yet utterly unable to incorporate the boundless steppes into Song territory, instead exhausting the state's strength in endless stalemates and ending with nothing but a hollow reputation.
The resilience, mobility, and adaptability of grassland tribes are like the wind—invisible yet everywhere; no matter how fierce the blows, they always find cracks to survive, revive, and regenerate. If they cannot be utterly conquered, they must be allowed to roam freely across the vast steppes, gathering and dispersing like wolf packs, forever impossible to eradicate.
Zhao Yu understood deeply: war is not merely a contest of weapons and force, but a battle of wisdom, patience, and strategy—the true victory lies not in temporary battlefield triumphs, but in building a stable, far-reaching strategic framework.
Long ago, Zhao Yu began pondering how to leverage his firearms advantage while learning from history, combining diplomacy, economics, culture, and other means to avoid repeating past mistakes.
Zhao Yu told himself: "Relying solely on military conquest is not only costly but unsustainable. The truly wise do not measure success by how many weapons they possess, but by how wisely they use them to achieve maximum victory with minimum cost."
Moreover, technological superiority is easily neutralized by enemy mobility and imitation—so the later one reveals one's hand, the less one is feared, the greater the element of surprise, and the higher the chance of ultimate victory.
Crucially, Zhao Yu had previously ignited popular resentment to resolve the Song Dynasty's extreme wealth disparity by enforcing the "Equal Taxation of Scholar-Gentry" and "Land Tax Merged with Head Tax"—honestly, this inflicted considerable damage on the Song state, requiring time to recuperate and slowly restore national strength.
And most crucially, what is politics?
In essence, politics is about people.
In politics, to defeat your enemy is simple: make your friends many, your enemy's friends few, then strike decisively to eliminate the enemy.
Remember: failing to strike a snake when you see it is one-third guilt; striking but failing to kill it is seven-tenths guilt.
So, in this war between Liao and Jin, Zhao Yu will let them fight each other first; only when Liao is truly on the brink and hatred between Liao and Jin has reached the point where some Liao people will not rest until every Jurchen is dead, will Zhao Yu step forward to reap the fruits of victory—never too late.
Thus, while Liao and Jin wage war, Zhao Yu fully implements his previously planned reforms, especially in Jinghu and Sichuan, where scholar-gentry landowners have not yet been crushed; he also exempts from taxation regions previously devastated by Song Jiang's and Fang Wu's rebellions, allowing them to recover.
In addition, Zhao Yu heavily invests in infrastructure—for example, he ordered the renovation of the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal.
The earlier Sui-Tang Grand Canal centered on Luoyang, with a circuitous route requiring travel through Luoyang to reach Yan from the south—lengthening transport distance and raising costs, failing to meet urgent frontline supply needs.
Should war break out against Liao or Jin, massive supplies are required to sustain rule and feed troops; by renovating the Grand Canal, southern goods can reach Yan directly, reducing transport time and losses.
Parts of the Sui-Tang Grand Canal had fallen into disuse due to war and siltation, and its winding route (e. g., from Hangzhou to Luoyang to Yanjing) meant the Song Dynasty needed a more direct north-south corridor if it were to act against the north.
End of Chapter
