Chapter 64

John was shrouded in the same fog as Chen Jingrun, unsure which side of Lin Ran was the real one.

He hesitated and asked, “Professor Lin, are you working for China?”

Lin Ran shook his head: “Of course not.

China is my homeland; I hope to help its development through this means.

I know you once helped Chinese scientists transport nuclear physics equipment back to China, so I guessed you’d be willing to assist me.

You know that with Rockefeller Foundation funding and Columbia University’s salary, I don’t lack money—I wish to aid Chinese researchers in this way.

I hope to help China advance technologically, so its people may live better lives through scientific progress.

Have you ever heard of my concept of Cultural China?”

Lin Ran briefly explained his concept, then added: “The Chinese share my skin tone and the same culture in our minds.”

The Chinese internet’s account of John George Quan’s assistance to China’s nuclear physics program was not exaggerated—perhaps even understated.

During his time at MIT, Zhao Zhongyao aimed to master the technology for manufacturing electrostatic accelerators and acceleration tubes. He needed access to core data, experimental equipment, and ways to procure critical components.

John not only allowed Zhao Zhongyao free use of the lab’s materials and equipment, but also provided multifaceted support, including full access to all lab resources and personally answering his technical questions.

The Chinese internet most celebrated the fact that the lab possessed an aging atmospheric proton electrostatic accelerator about to be retired; he labeled it “waste” and donated it free of charge to Zhao Zhongyao for experimentation and research.

Moreover, he leveraged his connections to help Zhao Zhongyao contact factories capable of producing accelerator components, resolving procurement difficulties.

Later, when Zhao Zhongyao returned to China with the equipment, key components, and books, he was detained in Yokohama, Japan, briefly imprisoned in Sōja Prison, and John still offered public support.

Remember, this was 1950—a sensitive time; for John to make such a stance was no small thing.

Of course, this was a matter of attitude: John clearly demonstrated his friendship toward China and willingness to help.

Lin Ran chose him for another crucial reason: ability.

John achieved all this without being investigated during the five years of McCarthyism from 1950 to 1955, and even after China’s atomic bomb succeeded in 1964, he still faced no investigation.

Yet even without direct evidence, Qian Lao was subjected to endless investigations merely for suspected sympathy.

John, however, directly assisted Chinese physicists—from theoretical learning to equipment manufacturing to transporting equipment back to China—fully involved, yet never faced any investigation or harassment.

He remained Anwen at MIT as a professor until retirement. This fully demonstrated John George Quan’s ability and connections.

Willingness, ability, and connections—these were the most important reasons Lin Ran sought him out.

Seeing John George still thinking, Lin Ran continued: “Professor, the academic journals needed are confined to scholarly fields—I fully trust you to oversee them.

If Fred’s funds are insufficient, tell me, and I’ll find a way to supplement you.”

Lin Ran meant that he would take not a single cent from the proceeds of his collaboration with Fred; all funds would be entrusted to John to purchase academic journals—how many, how to ship them to China, how much to spend—all left to John’s discretion.

This was absolute trust in the man’s character.

John considered it, then stared directly at Lin Ran with sharp eyes: “Lin, you trust me too much. On what grounds do you believe I can do this?”

Lin Ran smiled bitterly: “Perhaps it’s the intuition of a mathematician.

My intuition tells me you’re trustworthy.”

I can’t say I know history.

Yet this answer was convincing enough—at least on the surface, John believed it.

“Alright, alright.

Regarding sending academic journals to China, there are official methods, some gray-area methods, and one very special method.

Let me first explain the official method.

The first is to communicate with China, establishing a channel between the NAS and Chinese scientific organizations to mail Western academic journals to China.”

This NAS is not that NAS—here, NAS refers to the American National Academy of Sciences.

Lin Ran asked, “Would that work?”

John explained: “Whether it works depends on China. I believe America would gladly sign such cooperation agreements, but I’m unsure if China would agree.

In 1956, the NAS established the U.S.-Soviet Science and Technology Cooperation Committee; two years later, both sides signed the Ras-Zarubin Agreement on scientific and technical exchange for exchanging scientific publications.

If China is willing to sign, I can help push the American side.

Given that China and America have not yet established diplomatic relations, that’s another issue—but it’s worth trying.

The second is to seek Rockefeller Foundation sponsorship to establish a U.S.-China Academic Exchange Committee, then mail journals to China through this committee.

Official methods are all roughly the same: the journals that can be sent are limited, and restrictions are numerous.

The gray-area method involves transshipment through Xiangjiang, Yokohama, and other locations to get the journals there.

If you choose the official route, attempting gray-area methods afterward will drastically increase the risk.

At least I wouldn’t be suitable to help you with that anymore.”

John’s methods made Lin Ran wonder: could this man have specialized in this exact work? How could he know so much?

Like the Soviets and America: publicly at war, yet still willing to accept Western academic journals—yet they themselves refuse to supply China, not even secondhand scraps they’ve chewed over.

Lin Ran found the Soviets’ behavior utterly despicable.

“Didn’t you just say there’s a third method?”

John’s expression turned grave: “The third method is most effective—but if you intend to use it, you must think carefully.

The CIA has a so-called Operation Mockingbird, designed to bribe global journalists and institutions to gather intelligence—or even fabricate disinformation to mislead hostile nations.

You know America has long sought to disrupt China’s nuclear bomb development.

Telling them to send targeted journals containing false data to Chinese researchers could effectively interfere with China’s nuclear testing progress.”