Chapter 758 - 9 Knowing the Score

With Hornacek’s departure, Reggie Lewis successfully entered the Trail Blazers’ starting lineup, taking on the position of the starting Shooting Guard.

Reggie Lewis stands at 6 feet 7, just like Drexler, the wing and guard height of the Trail Blazers suddenly increased, making them one of the tallest starting teams in the League.

With Sabonis at 7 foot 4, Gan Guoyang joining the power forward position at 6 foot 10, Kossie being a typical heavy small forward (his weight is already approaching 240 pounds), plus Lewis and Porter, the Trail Blazers once again possessed an extraordinary starting height.

Therefore, before the new season started, many media speculated that the Portland Trail Blazers’ defensive level would rise to a new level, and they might return to the playing style of 1987 and 1988, using wave-like high-intensity defense and continuous one-on-one play to crush the opponent.

But at the start of tonight’s season opener against the Rockets, the Trail Blazers revealed a very special starting approach.

During the jump ball, Sabonis tipped the ball to Porter, who crossed half-court and passed to Sabonis, who was positioned high at the top of the arc.

The Trail Blazers’ opening play settled into a classic Princeton formation: the 221 position.

In theory, the Princeton System does not have specific positions, every player can play the role of all five positions.

This is because Princeton University, when recruiting players, oftentimes does not get the favor of top high school talents, especially those with a taller stature preferred for top inside players.

First, Princeton is not a basketball powerhouse and does not attract basketball geniuses; second, Princeton being an Ivy League school, has high academic requirements, and those black talents who only know how to play basketball can’t meet Princeton’s admission standards or receive scholarships (Princeton does not offer athletic scholarships).

Therefore, what Pete Carrell had at his disposal were players with mediocre talents, regular players who couldn’t go pro after college.

These players had no outstanding height, build, or speed, making it difficult to find a specialist in any single area, and often they couldn’t even find a tall center.

It was simpler to blur their positions, have them perform the same tasks on the court - dribbling, passing, shooting - which made it harder for opponents to defend.

However, applied to the Portland Trail Blazers, the situation was different. The Trail Blazers had a group of basketball geniuses who could fill many positions and functions, not out of necessity, but because they genuinely could.

Take Sabonis, standing at 7 foot 4, a genuine super-center height, yet he’s also a threat from the outside. He can play the four position, shoot long-range, pass, and can initiate an offense from beyond the three-point line.

There’s no need to mention Gan Guoyang; in this play, he showed up in the 5 position, serving as the pivot for the team’s set offense, next play he could be at the high post, and the play after that he might go to the wing as a spot-up shooter.

In the NCAA, the position blur in the Princeton System is out of necessity; in the NBA, the position blur in the Princeton System can instead enhance the team’s tactical variability and fully exploit the players’ versatility.

The reason Rick Adelman thought of Pete Carrell’s Princeton was that he realized that all three of the Trail Blazers’ big men were extremely versatile centers.

They were multi-talented, capable inside and out, especially with a good outside shooting and a great gift for passing, turning the disadvantage of the Princeton System into an advantage.

It’s a pity that Divac had left for the Boston Celtics; Adelman regretted this, as in his heart Divac fit this system better than Sabonis.

Position ambiguity can raise the ceiling for players and the team, correspondingly, the tactics inevitably become more complex, and players have more to think about.

With positioning fixed and tactical routines set, once players know their roles, they just have to go through the motions on the court.

For instance, in previous years, the Trail Blazers employed the "reduce two, increase one" strategy; tactics were initiated by the Point Guard, with wing players performing curls and cuts, that’s all it took.

Even earlier, like in 1987, it started off most simply with giving Gan the ball in the low post to initiate isolation; if doubled, he’d pass, if not, others would watch from outside.

Swap in a high schooler who never went to college to practice for a morning, and by the afternoon he’d know how to play the game.

The Princeton System is different, similar to the Triangle Offense, it emphasizes the autonomy of the players, who must make their own judgments based on the defensive situation and decide how to play.

It’s a real test of the players’ basketball IQ, their on-court experience, personal skill, and the level of chemistry between the players.

Following the 221 positioning to begin offense, Pete Carrell’s tactical manual left for the Trail Blazers had several hundred subsequent variations.

It’s simply impossible for a training camp to completely master these variations and apply them flexibly to a game.

It’s no wonder there were voices of skepticism within the Trail Blazers team; they had already taken 4 championships with past simple and effective tactics, so why learn something new?

Bobby Berman and Adelman together reviewed and streamlined these tactics, eliminating some that were not suitable for NBA rules and rhythm, overly complicated, or demanded too much from passing and movement.

Only some classic tactics with strong tactical deception, suitable for NBA conditions, were kept for regular training.

Even after this selection, these routines could still be divided into three major series, more than a dozen basic plans, and hundreds of variations.

It was still quite complex, which is why the Trail Blazers’ first offensive play did not turn out successful.