Chapter 1580: Military System Reform

Under Emperor Liu's direction, the military system reform still had to follow a principle of gradual, cautious progress. Large-scale, sweeping reductions and disbandment of troops were directly and sternly prohibited by Emperor Liu. Maintaining the stability of the Great Han and guaranteeing the security of national defense would always be placed first.

Therefore, even though ministers such as Zhao Pu, Wang Zhe, and Chen Yilun urgently hoped to reduce the number of regular imperial troops, they had no choice but to defer to Emperor Liu's wishes and adopt a more prudent approach to complete the process of renewing and replacing the army.

At the very least, Emperor Liu's immovable attitude had thoroughly loosened. With a beginning, one could hope for a good outcome.

With policy proposals drafted by civil and military heavyweights such as Zhao Pu and Cao Bin, and after review and approval by Emperor Liu, the Great Han's military system reform was officially launched on the fifteenth day of the seventh month of the thirteenth year.

According to the reform plan, with a ten-year period, the Great Han's internal and external armies would be gradually reduced, striving to maintain the total registered military force, including the imperial army, at a scale of four hundred thousand men after ten years.

Among them, the imperial army would number one hundred fifty thousand, the frontier army one hundred fifty thousand, and local forces one hundred thousand. Of course, this was only a rough target; the specifics would depend on the final results of the demobilization.

Regardless, striving to achieve this goal, given the current military scale, the court would need to cut at least half of its forces. This was absolutely not an easy task; it was a systematic, major project. For the policy to land smoothly and safely required time, and equally required financial support.

According to the plan formulated by the Bureau of Military Affairs, starting from the thirteenth year, the Great Han's internal and external armies would be reduced at a scale of fifty to sixty thousand men per year. At the same time, the number of newly recruited soldiers each year would be controlled, so as to achieve the goal of reducing the army's size.

In fact, in the Bureau of Military Affairs' normal management of national military administration, elimination and recruitment were also maintained — but that was normal military administration in operation. After all, soldiers also grew old; the older troops in the army needed younger, more robust men to replace them. That was a healthy, virtuous cycle.

Yet over the past decade or more, the number of newly recruited soldiers had basically far exceeded those retiring. The rapid expansion of the Great Han army had also taken shape during those ten-plus years.

After all, with the national territory larger, the pressure of national defense and public security was also rising. Everywhere needed troops to garrison, to maintain order, to suppress rebellions. Add to that several foreign expansion campaigns that all required replenishment of troops, and a single Kaibao northern expedition had driven the Great Han to its most frenzied military buildup. Although some were cut after the war, most were retained and became registered soldiers.

Only in recent years had the army's inflow and outflow entered a relatively slow rhythm, with annual retirement and recruitment numbers both maintained at a low level of around ten thousand, keeping a balance.

Demobilization and recruitment running in parallel remained the main policy for managing military scale — only, under the backdrop of downsizing, the former carried greater weight. Moreover, requirements for new recruits were higher: clean backgrounds, no criminal records, better physical fitness, and preferably proper families with property.

According to the reform plan, in the remaining half of the thirteenth year, demobilization operations would be formally initiated. The scale would not be too large at once; there was no demand for a comprehensive rollout. It would even serve merely as a pilot, with the target selected as the imperial troops in the capital region.

By now, around the Great Han's two capitals, the court's standing imperial army garrison exceeded one hundred fifty thousand men. If one added those in major cities across the country, strategic passes, and those rotating on frontier duty, the imperial army's total strength exceeded two hundred thousand.

Given the Great Han's current situation, the authority of the central government and the security of the capital region were fully guaranteed. There was truly no need to maintain such a large imperial army. Among the reasons, avoiding a condition of a strong periphery and weak center, which would create military imbalance, was a very important one.

Once the decision to demobilize was made, it naturally had to proceed both internally and externally. As the central military strength declined, the frontier army and local forces would naturally have to be reduced accordingly. And once this step was truly taken, there was no room for regret.

Originally, ministers such as Zhao Pu had intended to begin the rectification with the frontier army, selecting Liaodong as the first location — but Emperor Liu rejected this. In weighing national defense security against internal-external balance, Emperor Liu chose the former.

Clearly, compared to reform of the interior prefectural and circuit armies, Emperor Liu was more cautious in handling the frontier army. He had to consider national defense security and frontier tranquility, preferring to postpone somewhat, and directly required the Bureau of Military Affairs to ensure that subsequent demobilization plans for the frontier army be made with greater care and detail.

Reducing the court's registered officers and soldiers would certainly greatly ease the court's financial burden, and in the long run, it was beneficial. But this process was not simply a matter of cutting troop numbers and retiring soldiers.

To alleviate long-term fiscal pressure, one would face a heavier burden in the short term. Demobilization was not free. At the very least, with tens of thousands of troops retiring each year, the court had to pay a certain price to pacify and attend to the emotions of these officers and men in arranging for them. Otherwise, provoking military discontent and popular unrest would cause major problems.

Those being cut were all professional soldiers. In the army, apart from receiving education in loyalty to the sovereign and love of country, they trained in military skills and in waging war. Transferring tens of thousands of them at a wave into civilian life — if handled poorly, would pose a serious threat to public order.

In earlier years, regarding the elimination of officers and men, the court would basically arrange things properly: besides giving money and land, it could also try to arrange a position locally, either converting them to auxiliary soldiers with lesser treatment or sending them back to their home villages.

But that no longer worked now. The Great Han's corps of officials and clerks was already large enough; there were not that many positions. At the same time, the scale of demobilization was huge. Calculated at four hundred thousand men, even with ten years as a buffer, even if only the lowest-ranking clerical posts were considered, it would be impossible to free up four hundred thousand positions.

Therefore, the current retirement benefits for the Great Han's officers and men were far inferior to those of the past. And to pacify people's hearts, the only way was to think of solutions through money.

To this end, Emperor Liu had the Finance Commission allocate two million strings of cash annually, managed by specially appointed officials from the Bureau of Military Affairs, the Ministry of War, and the Ministry of Revenue, specifically for the retirement matters of officers and men, compensating them according to military rank. This counted as severance pay.

To ease the pressure on the Finance Commission, Emperor Liu again agreed to borrow money from the inner treasury. The previous loans, through several years, had still not been fully repaid — it was only because Emperor Liu charged no interest.

This time, however, Emperor Liu was far more proactive, with little idle talk — everything centered on military affairs. Although two million strings a year was not too much for the court, the cost of demobilization was not just a single "severance pay."

Most of the Great Han's common people were still quite simple and honest, and the army was the same. Long-trained and strictly disciplined as they were, facing demobilization they might have some complaints, but direct resistance was unlikely — of course, provided the treatment given was sufficient and enough sincerity was shown.

But for another group of people, one could not simply rely on money to pacify them. In the Great Han's military system, if squad leader and above counted as officers, then a demobilization scale of fifty thousand men meant that over a thousand officers would "lose their jobs" each year.

For them, one naturally could not demand that they go home and farm like ordinary soldiers. The higher the military rank, the more this was so. Besides money, they also had to be given power. Transferring them to local government offices as officials or clerks was the best disposal method.

Apart from continuing to strengthen the court's control and influence over the localities, this was also because those who could serve as officers in the army could all be called talents of the Great Han. Discarding so many men with managerial ability would also be a loss to the court.

Of course, this equally brought a new test to the court's civil service administration: the court had to guarantee over a thousand additional official and clerical positions each year to accommodate the placement of retired officers.

This might be somewhat troublesome, but in the end it was only a minor trouble. Zhao Pu almost thumped his chest in assurance to Emperor Liu that this matter could be resolved. And the solution Zhao Pu intended to adopt was to carry out a purge of local officials and clerks, freeing up enough positions.

In Zhao Pu's words, military affairs were not just military affairs; military reform also required nationwide coordination and support. Since the army had begun reform and renewal, the bureaucratic corps should follow closely and also be set in motion — making adjustments to those who were aged, corrupt, or occupying posts without doing their duties. This was a consistent requirement of the court's civil administration and conformed to the principles of official governance.

Of course, no matter how nicely the words were put, the fundamental reason was still to coordinate with the military system reform and to conveniently and properly arrange retired officers. Emperor Liu approved highly of this, feeling that Zhao Pu kept the overall situation in mind, was resolute in reform, and truly had the bearing of a chancellor.

In this regard, Emperor Liu also had experience. In earlier years, in order to concentrate power and cultivate an imperial faction, he had used various pretexts to purge some old ministers and meritorious nobles within the court, making room for younger, capable newcomers who were easy to appoint and control.