Chapter 1581: Military Reform 2

Any reform of affairs carries both benefits and drawbacks, and should be viewed from both positive and negative angles. At the moment of reform, it also possesses necessity as circumstances develop. If one does not base decisions on actual conditions, disregards objective laws, and relies on an emperor or those in power making decisions on a whim, stubbornly going their own way, then that is not reform, but reckless meddling that harms the nation and brings disaster to the people.

The Great Han court, or rather Emperor Liu, naturally did not decide to reform the military system merely because of a few memorials of remonstrance or some submitted advice, with a hot head and impulsive heart, making a snap decision.

In the preceding period, there had already been several years of deliberation, along with multi-faceted investigation and comprehensive consideration, before the conclusion was reached. The pressure on finances was also an objective situation, a practical necessity.

Of course, it was not that the Great Han's finances had truly encountered any problems. With the current income from major tax items such as the two-tax system, commercial taxes, and taxes on salt, iron, tea, and cotton, it was sufficient to maintain the normal operation of the state's military and administration, and could remain worry-free for ten years.

What ministers such as Zhao Pu considered was not to suppress the military, nor did they believe that the court's finances had truly reached a point where collapse would occur without military reductions.

The consolidation of national defense, the maintenance of border regions, and military construction—these major matters involving national security and the stability of political power—their importance was equally understood by them. They merely felt that in peacetime, maintaining such a massive army at such a high cost was truly unnecessary. Military expenditures could and should be limited, at least restricted to a healthy level.

In recent years, Emperor Liu, in maintaining Han legitimacy and in governing the state, had also been continuously adjusting, becoming more pragmatic and more focused on the present. But this did not mean he had completely lost his foresight or no longer possessed the ability to anticipate.

As the emperor of the empire, the weight of the crown compelled him to make long-term considerations, rather than waiting entirely until problems arrived before hastily responding. At the very least, he was unwilling to passively solve problems ten or twenty years later, when problems had deepened and conditions had become so severe that change was unavoidable.

Of course, whether he himself could live another twenty years was still unknown, but as long as he remained on the throne, what he could do and what he ought to do, he would still resolutely do, trying as much as possible not to leave problems to the succeeding sovereign. This was Emperor Liu's sense of responsibility as the founding sovereign, and also a matter of his character.

In any reform, there is a very important issue: while correcting current ills and alleviating old contradictions, one must also pay attention to the emergence of new problems and the expansion of new contradictions. This is extremely necessary.

In the many rounds of reform in the Great Han's past, countless cases had proven this point. No new policy's birth, no new system's reform, could achieve a single solution for all time, with a hundred benefits and no harms. Therefore, in this regard, the sovereign and ministers of the Great Han remained quite rational.

Looking at this military reform, if it succeeded and could be implemented step by step according to the plan formulated by the central government, then in the future, the Great Han's military expenditures could be effectively controlled, and the state's finances could also become more rational and healthy.

This was the benefit, and also the fundamental purpose of the reform. But equally, it brought new problems, bringing new contradictions between state finances and national defense construction. If this problem could not be resolved, then the reform could hardly be called a success, and might even cause disastrous consequences.

The most critical issue was: after large-scale military reductions and military expenditure cuts, how to maintain rule, how to consolidate national defense, and how to guarantee the security of the Great Han's ten-thousand-li territory.

For the disbanded troops, the duties they had originally borne—guarding the homeland and suppressing unrest—must find alternative solutions. The scale of officers and soldiers could be reduced, but not at the cost of sacrificing national security.

Therefore, reducing the size of the military was only the first step of the military reform. Closely following it, what should proceed simultaneously was organizing a force capable of filling the gap in national defense—that was the militia.

After years of construction, the Great Han had long since established a basic militia system nationwide. Within the annual military budget, there was also a portion specifically allocated for militia weapons, training, and supplies, managed by the military offices of each circuit and prefecture.

According to the Great Han's militia construction regulations, all registered militia volunteers were required, during the slack farming season each year, to undergo a training period of 45 to 60 days under the training commandants subordinate to the military offices, including basic training and the inculcation of military regulations. The compensation was exemption from certain corvée labor.

In wartime, these militia volunteers with basic training experience were unquestionably the most important and most reliable source of soldiers for the Great Han army, the primary recruitment target of the Bureau of Military Affairs, effectively supplementing the consumption of the unification and foreign wars.

However, with the passage of time, with the arrival of peace, the organizational construction of the militia had entered a state of stagnation, whether in terms of financial investment or training.

After all, when the Great Han had fought across the four seas without rivals, when war had in fact receded and society had returned to stability and tranquility, people's attention naturally shifted away from war, and their minds were entirely placed on the toil and bustle of making a living.

The border circuits and prefectures were acceptable—the environment and local customs were suitable for militia development, and with the strong support of the army and military offices, militia construction in border areas was maintained at a relatively high level with a rich atmosphere. What Li Jilong said about border militia volunteers bearing more responsibility in border defense affairs was also a fact.

In comparison, the situation in the interior circuits and prefectures was clearly not optimistic. Although martial practice remained fashionable among the Great Han's common people and was guided by the authorities, for most commoners, the cost of practicing martial arts was still high, and they did not have that much time and energy to participate deeply.

And through this military reform of the Great Han, the construction of the militia would also be increased. Unlike the previous maintenance of basic and simple training, the militia under the reform would face higher requirements, bear greater responsibilities, occupy a higher position in the Great Han army, and receive improved treatment.

Of course, this referred to those militia members who were selected and incorporated into the Great Han's national defense system. Not only were they needed as replacements for the reduced regular troops in border areas, but for the local circuits and prefectures, they would also become auxiliary forces for the stationed garrisons.

The strategy drafted by the Bureau of Military Affairs was to select the strong and able from the militia, and organize and train them into a semi-military force, called the militia corps. This was to re-plan a new force within the Great Han's military system, a force that would fill the gaps in national defense and garrison duties.

According to the requirements put forward by the Bureau of Military Affairs, local militia corps soldiers were to maintain at least two hundred days of training each year, bear the responsibility of maintaining public order, and serve away from their home regions. For border militia corps, the term was three years; after the three-year term expired, they would be transferred back to their places of origin. The age limit was also relaxed to forty years old.

Most critically, these militia corps soldiers, except during war or special missions such as suppressing bandits and quelling rebellions, were not given military pay. In its place, the court exempted these militia soldiers' households from poll tax, the two-tax system, and the corvée labor of two persons per household per year.

And the court's normal expenditure for maintaining these militia corps soldiers consisted only of daily training, clothing, weapons, and supplies, with equipment requirements also one grade lower. Such treatment, compared with the court's registered regular troops, could be called cheap. Of course, compensation for casualties was also to be given, likewise inferior to that of registered officers and soldiers.

The construction of the militia corps was also the most important and most fundamental measure implemented by the court in the military reform, and the military expenditures saved came precisely from this.

There is no doubt that militia corps soldiers were more than one grade weaker than the court's regular troops. The impact of troop reductions could not be compensated by mere militia corps soldiers alone, and the Great Han's national defense strength would decline substantially.

However, on the basis of basically guaranteeing national defense, it could achieve the goal of maintaining normal military expenditures, while also further perfecting the Great Han's military system.

Throughout the entire military reform, the only army that remained unchanged was roughly the Imperial Guard protecting Emperor Liu—the emperor's personal troops, the last line of defense guarding the imperial city and protecting Emperor Liu. No matter when, their status and their strength would never waver.

Additionally, the tribal troops that had once been a component of the Great Han army also faced disbandment. The court would no longer maintain their basic establishment, and among them, those with merit and those loyal to the Great Han would be selected and incorporated into the Han army.

When war broke out and there was need, they could be temporarily conscripted, with temporary expenditures, to organize for combat. This was also a consideration for eliminating the military threat of the barbarian peoples. Of course, armies like the Flying Trench Army of the southwest were still preserved—they could no longer be considered tribal troops.