Chapter 243: Tang Han 2

ID "Geostrategic Enthusiast" asks: "By the way, what's the situation between Tang Han and India now? Looking at the map, the two are adjacent on land (Arakan Coast and East Coast Enclave), opposite each other at sea (Andaman Sea); doesn't that mean daily skirmishes?"

Soon, the familiar IP "Republic of Tang Han·Anjing" user "Anjing Idler" appears again, replying with a tone uniquely local, mixing helplessness and pugnacity:

"What's the situation? It's like both sides dare not strike, yet each wants to seize the other's territory. On the border, soldiers on both sides have been staring each other down for decades, with small‑scale clashes, cross‑border reconnaissance, and naval standoffs occurring a few times each year. But a large‑scale hot war? No one dares to fire the first shot. Moreover, India and Tang Han have been mortal enemies from the start. India regards the Andaman Islands and those few parcels on the East Coast as a national humiliation, territories seized by 'Chinese colonizers.' On our side, textbooks say how India once tried to 'strangle' us while we were still unstable, and many predecessors died under Indian artillery fire. The common folk on both sides look at each other with disgust."

"If you ask me," ID "Historical Review Party" interjects, "the main reason is that Li Nian'an died far too early. He passed away in 1980, before the golden Cold War period had fully ended. With the ferocity he showed in the founding years and the peak of Tang Han's military power, had he been alive, he might have dared to expand the gains while both the United States and the Soviet Union still needed him as a pawn and India was riddled with internal problems—perhaps linking the East Coast Enclave into a contiguous block, or definitively settling the legal status of the Andaman Islands. But after his death, his successor Li Zhenguo lacked that boldness."

"Anjing Idler" seems somewhat dissatisfied with Li Zhenguo: "There's nothing we can do; President Li Zhenguo… can only be said to dabble in politics, juggle the Balance, excel at preservation but fall short on expansion. Facing an opponent the size of India, he lacks his father's reckless 'barefoot, unafraid of shoes' daring. Now Tang Han and India are like two mutually wary porcupines, each aware of the other's quills—if they truly clash it would hurt, so they keep their distance, baring teeth."

At this point, the IP shown as "India·New Delhi" user "Sand of the Ganges" joined, writing in English with a sarcastic tone: "Can't strike? It's because Tang Han knows the limits of its power. In the Li Nian'an era, you relied on external handouts. Now the international environment has changed. India is waiting, and time is on our side."

This provocation immediately drew a rebuttal.

"Sand of the Ganges"'s words sparked further discussion about Tang Han's past strength.

ID "Wind of the Pacific" (United States IP) appears again: "Saying Tang Han relied on external handouts is both right and wrong. The point is, Tang Han really was strong back then! During the Cold War, how many countries were covertly or openly backing it? We won't list them, but it had the biggest overt patron. Yet you might not believe it— the Soviet Union, in certain periods, also gave Tang Han support."

The moment that was said, a sea of question marks flooded the forum.

"Wind of the Pacific" continues: "That isn't contradictory. In the Cold War's intricate game, Tang Han's position was uniquely special. For the United States, it was a forward post to curb republicanism's expansion in Southeast Asia, to monitor the Indian Ocean, and it could also check India. For the Soviet Union? A pro‑American but not monolithic state with sharp contradictions with India—if used wisely, Tang Han could disperse American focus and even play a subtle role on certain issues. Evidence shows that when Sino‑Indian relations fluctuated in the late 1960s to early 1970s, the Soviet Union, via Eastern European channels, supplied Tang Han with some non‑lethal industrial technology and even shared intelligence, aiming to pressure India. Of course, that support was brief, covert, and full of calculation."

"So Tang Han at the time navigated between the two poles, taking advantage of both sides?" a netizen asked.

"You could say that. But Tang Han's 'strength' wasn't solely due to external transfusions." ID "Military History Grave Digger" takes the floor: "Its own military power and war performance are the fundamental reasons it dared to challenge India and even made the big backers uneasy. In short, the big players think: we can have a junior ally, but not one that's too capable or too ambitious. Tang Han's later collective sanctions stem from that."

"Speaking of it, just how fierce was it?" the original poster "Old Dream of Nanyang" asks further.

"Military History Grave Digger" posted a long reply, clearly having done the homework:

"By analogy, we say the Korean War was the 'Founding War', we call it 1v17 (UN Forces). Tang Han? It has an even more exaggerated record. It directly clashed with a coalition of European colonizers and won."

"The events likely occurred from the late 1950s to early 1960s. At that time Tang Han was expanding in northern Borneo and the southern Sulu Archipelago, engaging in fierce clashes with the remaining British and Dutch forces there and the indigenous militias they supported. After the conflict escalated, Britain courted the Netherlands, Portugal (which still held East Timor then), and even some French mercenaries, forming a 'Colonial Interests Joint Task Force' that launched an offensive against Tang Han's controlled zones. Ostensibly it was to 'maintain regional stability and existing treaties,' but in reality it aimed to snuff out this suddenly emerged Chinese‑led armed regime in its cradle."

"The war lasted roughly two years. The fighting was brutal, but the outcome was that Tang Han held its core area and even pushed back some territory. The pivotal turning point was a naval ambush; Tang Han's then‑tiny navy leveraged the complex reef terrain and intelligence edge to heavily damage a segment of the coalition's fleet. Internal discord and chaotic command within the coalition forced them to negotiate. Consequently, Tang Han gained 'de facto recognition' from the International Community, though legally it faced a host of complications."

"Why could it win? Besides terrain and morale, a very important factor was that its army included Germans—former Wehrmacht and even SS officers and NCOs."

"Huh?" the forum was again flooded with astonishment.

"Surprised?" "Military History Grave Digger" seems to relish the effect, "After World II, many German soldiers—especially Eastern Front veterans and staff officers—found themselves in awkward positions. After the Nuremberg Trials, West Germany was very cautious in staffing its rebuilt army, and many experienced but 'unclean' personnel were excluded. At the same time, under Li Nian'an's leadership, Tang Han was eager to build a modern, Deyu Xunlian army. He himself, influenced by his father's German‑style military education, highly admired the German Army's tactical system."

"Thus a secret channel was established. Through intermediaries, a group of battle‑experienced German retired officers and technical NCOs arrived in Tang Han under the titles of 'military advisors,' 'engineers,' and 'training instructors.' They helped Tang Han build a complete staff system, training curricula, armor and artillery manuals, and even took part in planning early fortifications and modifying some weapons. That 'European Coalition' was, to some extent, fighting a 'German-style Division'‑enhanced opponent adapted to tropical island warfare."