Chapter 244: Tang Han III

"That's not all," ID "European exile" added, seeming to have special knowledge of this period, "During the Cold War, it wasn't just soldiers; many Germans, mainly Xide officials, intellectuals, and even members of the Junker aristocratic families who were frustrated or marginalized, also for various reasons went to Tang Han."

"The reasons are complex. Some were idealistic, wanting to build a 'new home' in the East or to practice a certain social idea. Some were fleeing postwar reckoning or a repressive social atmosphere. Some were simply adventure and speculation. Tang Han offered them higher social status, a chance to help build a 'New Nation', and… a relatively relaxed environment. Li Nian'an needed their knowledge, technology, managerial experience, and even international contacts. The events of those ten years on our side indeed caused some Chinese scholars and literati who felt uncertain about their future, as well as some Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora families that had been watching, to ultimately choose Tang Han."

"Anjing idler" confirmed this: "Let me tell you like this. We are 56 ethnic groups. Tang Han is more than that. The official line is 'a multi‑ethnic integrated nation', but in reality, besides the local groups—Chinese, Malay, and indigenous peoples—there are also descendants of 'political exiles', 'technical refugees', and 'adventurers' who gathered during the Cold War from around the world. Around the collapse of the Soviet Union, even some former Soviet engineers and soldiers came over. Any family or individual who felt they could not survive locally or saw no future often regarded Tang Han as an option. It can only be said that while Li Nian'an was alive, his personal prestige, iron‑fisted political methods, and ongoing external conflicts could suppress these people, twisting them into a single rope outward."

"The key is that he could suppress them!" "Military history grave‑robber" sighed, "Otherwise how could anyone say he could fight? A nation composed of refugees, broken troops, exiles, and adventurers would have explosive internal contradictions, as you can imagine. Yet Li Nian'an managed, using a shared survival crisis, strict militarized management, and continual small‑scale victories, to maintain internal cohesion and combat effectiveness. He turned Tang Han into a highly militarized war machine—efficient but under enormous internal pressure."

The discussion returned to why Tang Han was so "fierce", yet ultimately could not advance further and instead provoked sanctions.

ID "International Political Observer" offered an analysis:

"Tang Han's 'fierceness' was its survival capital during a specific phase of the Cold War, but also its ultimate ceiling. When its strength and ambition began to exceed the 'proxy' or 'buffer zone' role set by the behind‑the‑scenes big players, the hammer came down."

"If we don't sanction any longer, it won't be Wu Chang. It will have to become Liu Chang. The statement is exaggerated, but it reflects the essence. In the mid‑to‑late 1970s, Tang Han's national power peaked: it possessed one of Southeast Asia's most elite armies, trained in Deyu Xunlian, equipped with American gear, a navy capable of controlling key waterways, and began dabbling in missiles and electronic warfare with shadows of German and Israeli technology sources. The economy kept growing. Leveraging the China‑US‑Soviet triangle, its diplomatic space was vast. Li Nian'an even began proposing regional security initiatives, trying to act as the 'Nanyang spokesperson'."

"That crosses the red line. For the United States, an overly powerful, uncooperative Tang Han could disrupt its ally network in Southeast Asia and become harder to control. For the Soviet Union, a Tang Han that might tilt toward the United States and is strong would be detrimental to its plans in India and Vietnam. For Huaxia... the situation is most complex. On one hand, Tang Han is a Chinese nation with blood ties and is useful for containing India. On the other hand, a regime with strong military power and internal tendencies toward 'Nanyang Chinese separatism' or even an 'anti‑communist bridgehead' does not align with our long‑term interests. Especially when Tang Han began trying to influence Southeast Asian Chinese communities and even maintained a certain ambiguous contact with Taiwan authorities, our stance inevitably turned cautious."

Thus, an unspoken joint sanction began. Not an open declaration of war or blockade, but a more subtle strangulation: 1. Technology embargo: the United States, Soviet Union, and the Western bloc gradually tightened high‑technology transfers to Tang Han, especially in nuclear, missile, and cutting‑edge electronics fields.

2. Financial restrictions: International financial institutions began placing more obstacles on Tang Han's loans and investments, accusing it of 'human rights issues' and 'lack of democracy'.

3. Diplomatic isolation: pushing Dongmeng to form a common stance on issues like the South China Sea, marginalizing Tang Han. In the United Nations and other venues, Tang Han's proposals were handled indifferently.

4. Secretly supporting opposition: backing the political demands of non‑Chinese ethnic groups within Tang Han, as well as the 'Kaipai' like Li Huaijin, to internally counterbalance the hardline line of Li Zhen'guo's government.

"1978-1982 was a pivotal turning point. Li Nian'an fell gravely ill in his later years, and Tang Han faced a series of diplomatic setbacks: a request to purchase advanced fighter jets was denied, a regional cooperation initiative collapsed, and the economy was affected by fluctuations in international raw material prices and sanctions. After Li Nian'an's death, Li Zhen'guo confronted a deteriorating external environment and emerging internal fissures. They had to contract, shifting more effort toward internal stability and economic development, while adopting a more conservative stance abroad. The ambition to 'take India' could only remain in the memories of the older generation and the slogans of nationalists."

The discussion finally returned to the present situation.

"Anjing idler" concluded: "So the Tang‑India standoff you see now is exactly this: 1. Militarily: high alert, but no one dares to strike first. India's total military strength is superior, but Tang Han's forces have advantages in quality, especially in command systems, a few elite units, and island defensive terrain. Both sides maintain strong naval presences in the Andaman Sea and Mengjiala Wan, and the arms race continues."

2. Economically: limited border trade and offshore energy extraction cooperation in disputed waters even sees tentative joint development, but the main dynamic remains competition and precaution. India tries to use economic influence to infiltrate Tang Han's neighboring countries and isolate Tang Han. Tang Han strives to deepen economic ties with Singapore, the Malaysian Chinese business community, and the Mainland.

3. Politically: a war of words continues, each side accusing the other of being an 'expansionist' or 'supporter of separatist forces'. Nationalist sentiment is a tool both governments can exploit. Yet at the top levels, secret communication channels actually exist to handle crisis incidents and prevent misjudgments.

4. Internally: this is Tang Han's biggest soft spot. After Li Zhen'guo, Tang Han's leaders could no longer wield the absolute authority Li Nian'an had. The contradictions arising from its multi‑ethnic, multi‑origin population began to surface after Li Nian'an's strongman politics ended. Indigenous peoples in Borneo demand greater autonomy or even independence. Descendants of early European and other immigrants have formed their own communities and interest groups. Within the Chinese community, factions have split into 'Benpai', 'Mainland liaison faction', and 'International faction'. The government must expend massive effort to maintain balance, which drains the nation's strategic drive."

"Ganges Sand" concluded with a line: "India has patience. Tang Han's cohesion will wear down over time. When internal problems become large enough, external pressure will take effect. The Andaman Islands will eventually return home."